

Funisulanus Vettonianus governed it as a consular from 79 to 81, one might suggest the following tentative list of the subsequent *legati* of the province:

<i>Legatus</i>	Term	<i>Cos.</i>	Status
Ignotus A ²⁵	782–83	?	Praetorian or consular
C. Cilnius Proculus	84–86	87	Praetorian
Ignotus B ²⁵	87–91	93 ²⁶	Praetorian
Q. Pomponius Rufus	92–94	95	Praetorian
Ignotus C ²⁵	95–97	98 or later	Praetorian
Macer	98–	?	Praetorian

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25. If one cared to accept Fitz's rather adventurous reconstruction of a Dalmatian-Moesian career structure (*op. cit.*, pp. 69–71, on which see Eck's pertinent comments, *op. cit.*, p. 223, n. 465), one might identify Ignotus A with Sex. Octavius Fronto (*cos.* 86), Ignotus B with (L.) Julius Mar(inus)

(*cos.* 93 or 97) and Ignotus C with A. Caecilius Faustinus (*cos.* 99?).

26. The *fasti* for the latter half of Domitian's reign are complete except for 93.

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION OF PLATO *PARMENIDES* 132A1–4

Parmenides is made to introduce his celebrated "Third Man" argument (*Parm.* 132A1–B2) as follows:

Οἱμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκάστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι·
ὅταν πόλλ' ἅττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως
δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα
ἡγῇ εἶναι.

There has been a certain amount of controversy, among translators and commentators, over the exact sense of these lines. Looking over the various versions produced in the last hundred years or so, one may divide the disputants into three main groups, the division being made on the basis of their treatment of the ubiquitous infinitive *εἶναι*. For the sake of convenience, I shall designate the four occurrences of this infinitive by Roman numerals: I designate as I the *εἶναι* of 132A1, as II that of 132A2, and so on. Now, one group (e.g., Burges and Fowler)¹ has I, II, and IV function in a copulative, III in an existential, capacity. Another group (e.g.,

Taylor and Cornford)² has I and III in the existential, II and IV in the copulative, mode. Finally, the most recent group (so far represented only by Professor Vlastos)³ would cast all four in an existential role.

I outline the three groups primarily as an introduction to the version I wish to recommend, not for polemical considerations. The version I shall offer is based on our taking all four occurrences of *εἶναι* to be copulative. Obviously, I cannot claim originality for this version. Nor can its grammatical possibility be used to recommend it over the other versions, for they too (excepting the last) are grammatically possible. What really recommends this version is that it opens, whereas the others tend to obstruct, the way to a complete and deeper understanding of the philosophical content of the passage and hence, to that of the entire argument. In Section I, I shall briefly comment on each occurrence of *εἶναι*. I shall deal first with II, III, and IV, then with I. I deal with the *εἶναι*

1. G. Burges, *The Works of Plato*, III (London, 1850), 41; H. N. Fowler's version is in the LCL edition of the *Parmenides* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1953).

2. A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies* (London, 1934), p. 43; F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London, 1939), pp. 87–88.

3. G. Vlastos, "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (*Parm.* 132A1–B2): Text and Logic," *Philos. Q.*, XIX (1969), 289–301, esp. 290 and 298, n. 12.

of 132A1 last for the simple reason that I am unable to see how we can deal with it first. That is, we can decide on the function of this line only by considering it in relation to the rest of the passage. In Section II, I shall offer my version along with a few words on the philosophic points at issue.

I

132A2

Admittedly, the *εἶναι* here may be either existential or copulative. Moreover, there is no contextual element in the sentence itself which unequivocally favors one alternative over the other. Fortunately, although it is not particularly important to the issue in the passage, this sentence is important to a general logico-philosophical feature of the argument Parmenides proceeds to develop. This feature may help us in our inquiry. A reading of Parmenides' entire argument makes it apparent that we have, in every one of its (infinite) steps, the formation of a set or group of entities; and all these entities are members of the set by virtue of satisfying the same condition. In the first step of the argument (132A1–4), the set is constituted by sensibles only (*πολλ' ἄττα*).⁴ The set formed in the second step (132A6–8) includes the sensibles of the first set (*τάλλα*, 132A6)⁵ plus the Form which is there posited over them (*αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα*, 132A6), and so on. Now it is precisely in the sentence we are considering that the condition for membership, namely "being large," is first made known to us. Given the importance of this condition, it would be natural for Plato to highlight "large," and to do so in accordance with common Greek practice, i.e., to use *μεγάλα* in a predicative position. And the emphasis here is surely on *μεγάλα*, preceding, as it does, both the verb *δόξη* and its complementary infinitive *εἶναι*. It is most likely, then, that *μεγάλα* is the predicate of this sentence, qualifying the subject expression *πολλ' ἄττα* through the intervention of the copulative complementary infinitive *εἶναι*.

132A2–3

The *εἶναι* here is unanimously taken to be existential. The reasons, as far as I can see, are these: the subject of the impersonal *δοκεῖ* is the *entire* expression, *μία τις ὥως ἰδέα ἡ αὐτή*; *ἡ αὐτή* is included in the subject expression because it is in apposition to *μία ἰδέα*; and the clue to the appositive character of *ἡ αὐτή* is furnished by the fact that it is in the same case as *μία ἰδέα*, i.e., in the nominative. However possible all this may be, it does not mean that *ἡ αὐτή* is necessarily used by Plato in an appositive capacity. For it may still be the predicate of the complementary clause *ἡ αὐτή εἶναι*. Moreover, we can account for its being in the nominative, not by seeing it in apposition to *μία ἰδέα*, but by pointing out that a predicative expression agrees with its subject (here *μία ἰδέα*) in number, gender, and case, when the main verb is the copula (e.g., *Κῦρος ἐστὶ βασιλεύς*) or a copulative verb like *δοκεῖ εἶναι* and certain others (e.g., *Ἀλκιβιάδης ἦρέθη στρατηγός*).⁶ In other words, *ἡ αὐτή* may be a predicative expression qualifying *μία ἰδέα* through the intervention of *δοκεῖ εἶναι*. In fact this analysis seems to me more than possible for this reason. Had Plato wanted to employ both *μία* and *ἡ αὐτή* as attributive adjectives qualifying *ἰδέα*, he would have been inclined, I believe, to put them in the "co-ordinate" position, i.e., to connect them with *καί*, as he does earlier in the dialogue (cf. 131B1, B3–4). I suggest that *ἡ αὐτή* is not an attributive but a predicative adjective, i.e., it describes, and does not ascribe, a state of the *μία τις ἰδέα*. To do this, it requires the services of the copulative *εἶναι*.

132A3–4

Everyone, except Vlastos, considers this *εἶναι* as a copulative infinitive. Vlastos argues that a simple predicative rendering of the sentence (something like "... the Large is one"), "does not do full justice to the sense." For "what is being inferred here is not just the predicative statement that Largeness is

4. I have argued for this in *Philos. Q.*, XXI (1971), 255–59.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Cf. R. Kühner, *Grammar of the Greek Language*⁸

(trans. Edwards and Taylor [New York, 1888]), §240; see also W. W. Goodwin, *Greek Grammar* (Boston, 1883), §138.

one but the existential one that the unitary thing, Largeness, exists.”⁷ He translates accordingly: “Hence you believe that the one thing, Largeness, exists.”

Vlastos obviously looks back to what has gone before, when he makes this point. He surely uses “inferred” advisedly. He sees I, II, and III as existential and he reasons, quite properly under the circumstances, that Parmenides will naturally conclude here with an existential statement. However, I, II, and III are equally likely to function in their copulative capacity; so we need not look for, or expect, an existential IV. On the other hand, any attempt to see IV as existential will be taxing Plato’s text and ignoring common Greek practice.

In his attempt to divest $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ τὸ μέγα . . . $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ of its predicative-copulative elements, Vlastos finds it necessary to treat $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ as a noun (he makes it a substantive expression) and to place it in apposition to τὸ μέγα (compare his “the one thing, Largeness, exists”). Having done so, he cannot but force $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ into an existential role. Now it seems unlikely that Plato would wait twenty-four centuries for someone else to make his bare $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ a substantive and to place it in apposition to τὸ μέγα. He is quite capable of doing this himself. The simplest way would be to add the definite article τὸ in front of the $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$. Although he is not fond of it, Plato does make the numeral $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$ (μία, $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$) substantive, as, for example, $\acute{\omicron} \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$ at *Crito* 48A. More frequently, he places it, along with the participle of the verb $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, in apposition to the qualified noun (e.g., τὸ $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$. . . $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu$, *Parm.* 131A8–9; $\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$ μία καὶ η αὐτὴ οὐσα, *Parm.* 131B3–4).

It seems then that Plato, had he wished to say what Vlastos thinks he is saying, would have used such expressions as τὸ μέγα τὸ $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ or τὸ $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ τὸ μέγα or τὸ μέγα $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu$. On the one hand, these expressions capture completely the sense of Vlastos’ “the one thing, Largeness . . .” On the other hand, their availability suggests that one cannot uphold Vlastos’ view unless he is prepared to make one

of two assumptions: either the definite article was omitted from the copies of the original text, or the participle $\acute{\omicron}\nu$ was omitted and the word order tampered with. Both of these assumptions, however, seem gratuitous. Plato does not use any of the above expressions simply because he does not wish to make the point they normally convey. Instead, he employs $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ as a straightforward predicative adjective, qualifying τὸ μέγα through the intervention of the copulative $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$.

132A1

We are in a position now to decide on the function of I. I think, in view of the fact that IV is unquestionably a copulative infinitive, that we must regard I also as copulative. There are two reasons, complementing each other, for this. First, there is the general outline of the passage. At 132A1 Parmenides states his intention of giving us a reason for some feature or other of the Platonic Forms, while he concludes, at 132A3–4, by telling us what exactly he thinks he has given us a reason for in the intervening lines (132A2–3). We should expect then that the statement of his intention and the statement of his conclusion would agree in substance. Reinforcing this expectation, there is a stylistic feature of the passage, a striking parallelism in construction between 132A1 and 132A3–4. The parallel is between $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ τοῦ τοιοῦδε $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$. . . $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ and $\acute{\omicron}\theta\epsilon\nu$ $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$. . . $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$. One might say there is a one-to-one correspondence between the words and their respective functions. This structure is clearly no accident. It is rhetorically skillful. It also draws attention to the similar functions the two lines perform: they convey the same sort of information. 132A1 states that each Form in general is “one”; 132A3–4 makes the same point about the Form of Largeness in particular. What better means could Plato use to emphasize their similarities than constructing them identically? In specific terms, however, the parallel is indicative of two things: (1) Plato wants to emphasize the $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ (reading the passage aloud would make this obvious); and (2) since $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ τοῦ

7. Vlastos, *op. cit.*, p. 299, n. 17.

τοιούδε and ὅθεν refer to the same thing, Parmenides' reason given in the intervening lines, both occurrences of εἶν must be understood in the same way. Now it is typical Greek practice to emphasize the predicative expression. Moreover, in accordance with (2), the εἶν of 132A1 must be understood as a predicative adjective since the εἶν of 132A3–4 is unquestionably so. If the εἶν of 132A1 is predicative, then the εἶναι of the same line is a copulative infinitive.

II

Taking the foregoing into account, I suggest the following translation, or something similar, for 132A1–4:

I gather it is from the following reason (premise, notion) that you think that each Idea (Form) is one: whenever many sensibles seem to you to be large, a certain (μία τις) Idea perhaps appears to be the same, in your view of all of them (sensibles). From this you infer that the Large (the Form of Largeness) is one.

I should perhaps comment on two points before I proceed. The rendering of 132A2–3 (μία τις . . . ἰδόντι) sounds somewhat awkward; it might be better to render it existentially, but without losing sight of the point that the Greek is (for me) a predicative statement. The same may be said, I think, of the similar construction at *Cratylus* 435E: . . . τέχνη δὲ μία ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων . . . Perhaps the issue here cannot be properly settled unless we ascertain first the logical, not philological, use Plato makes of the terms μία and ἡ αὐτή. The "Third Man" argument certainly seems to turn, as I shall try to indicate, on the notions of "one," "same," "many," and "different." The second point has to do with the way I render the verb ἡγῆ (132A3). I translate it as "infer" because this brings out the point that there is a "movement" of thought from one proposition to another. It is the function of

the two adverbial expressions ἐκ and ὅθεν, both of which indicate "motion," to direct our attention to the movement of thought. The movement is from "a certain Form is the same" to "the Form is one."⁸

Parmenides' point here seems to be this. "From the fact that there is no qualitative difference in the Form, as you see it over the many sensibles it 'orders' and 'unifies,' you infer that this Form is one. The absence of qualitative difference implies numerical identity, oneness. The Form, in other words, is one both 'in number' and 'in content.'" That this is the significant point here is borne out by what Parmenides proceeds to do. He contradicts the proposition that the Form is one, by showing that there are two (three, four, etc.) "appearances" of this Form. He also contends, or clearly hints, that the numerically distinct "appearances" are also distinct "in content," i.e., they are qualitatively diverse. He says, for instance, that the second "appearance" is ἄλλο (132A10) than the first; and that the third "appearance" is ἕτερον (132B1) from all the rest.

Parmenides' aim in all this is quite clear. He wishes to place his conclusion, that there are *many* and *different* "appearances" of the Form, in opposition to the point made at 132A1–4, that the Form is *one* and the *same*. But, more significantly, the only reason he seems to have for thinking that the many "appearances" of the Form are different is his tacit transposition of the "Socratic" inference in 132A1–4, namely that numerical diversity implies qualitative diversity (Leibniz' Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles?). It is this feature, that the infinitely many "appearances" of the Form are also distinct in content, which gives rise to the vicious, as opposed to a harmless, regress of the "Third Man."

I have said enough. The threads are too many, and too thin, to disentangle in this discussion. Suffice it to say that the same sort of threads run through the fabric of Eleatic metaphysics; and again, the same sort of

8. More precisely, the inference is from the statements of 132A2–3 (ὅταν . . . ἰδόντι) to those of 132A3–4 (ὅθεν . . . εἶναι) and 132A1 (ἐν ἑκάστων εἶδος . . . εἶναι).

threads gave, generations later, Leibniz, Russell, and others many an hour of hard work. Plato seems to come face to face with a set of problems, bequeathed to him by his philosophical grandfathers, which

he passes on, without comment, to his progeny.

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VERBS COMPOUNDED WITH *TRANS-* IN LIVY'S TRIUMPH REPORTS

In the course of his history Livy is careful to report the triumphs of victorious Roman generals on their return to the city. One of the noteworthy features of these reports is the frequency of verbs compounded with *trans-* in the booty lists. The generals are often said *transferre*, *transvehere*, or *traducere* the spoils.¹ The meaning regularly assigned to the three verbs in the context of a triumph report is "to parade," "to carry in procession."² But these versions do not appear to give full force to the *trans-* prefix. Across what are the captured prisoners, money, weapons, and so forth being led or conveyed?

Central to the triumph was the ritual crossing of the *pomerium*. Even after he had been granted permission to triumph by the senate, the successful commander had to wait outside the *pomerium* until the ceremony itself.³ Only in the triumph ceremony could he come into Rome with his military *imperium* intact; if he entered the city otherwise than in the triumph, he automatically reverted to a merely civilian magistrate. Entry with complete military authority was an essential feature of the triumphal celebration.⁴

In his book *Triumphus*, H. Versnel explores in great detail this aspect of the Roman

triumph, which he explains as a rite that allows a person endowed with an extraordinary favor from the gods, derived in part from his unlimited *imperium militiae* and in part from his success in campaign, to pass on this favor to the community to which he returns. For Versnel the celebration thus is not only, nor perhaps chiefly, an honor for the general, but a means of benefiting the city by welcoming within it a person of superior divine gifts.⁵ The great value of the explanation for our purposes is the attention it redirects to the triumph as a solemn entry into the city. The Romans themselves made much of the actual entry, as the role of the *pomerium* in the triumphal ceremony shows; other indications are the use of the expression *triumphans urbem inire* (*invehi*) in the general's request to the senate, and the passage through a particular gate, the Porta Triumphalis.⁶

It seems reasonable to suggest that the specific connotation of the *trans-* verbs in triumph reports is a reference to the crossing of the *pomerium*. Their use focuses attention not on the fact of a parade or procession but on the initial significant act of the triumphal ceremony, the ritual entry into the city across the sacred boundary. We should understand

1. The usual verb is *ferre*: 6. 29. 8, 10. 46. 14, 26. 21. 7, 28. 9. 16, 30. 45. 3, 31. 20. 7, 31. 49. 7, 33. 23. 4 and 7, 33. 37. 11, 34. 10. 4 and 7, 34. 46. 2, 37. 46. 4, 37. 59. 3, 39. 5. 4, 39. 7. 1, 39. 42. 3, 40. 34. 8, 40. 43. 6, 41. 13. 7. *Transferre*: 33. 23. 9, 34. 52. 4 and 8, 36. 39. 2, 36. 40. 12, 37. 58. 4, 40. 16. 11, 40. 34. 8, 40. 59. 2, 41. 7. 2, 45. 40. 1, 45. 43. 4. *Transvehere*: 10. 46. 5, 33. 23. 4, 33. 37. 11, 36. 40. 11, 39. 7. 2. *Traducere*: 36. 40. 11. *Trans-* verbs also in descriptions of booty in triumphal processions in Plin. *NH* 33. 16, 141, 148, and 151, and 37. 13; Quint. 6. 3. 61; Florus 2. 12.

2. E.g., Lewis and Short, s. v.; F. Calonghi, *Dizionario latino-italiano* (Turin, 1950), s. v.; Weissenborn-Müller's edition with commentary (7^{te} Aufl., Berlin, 1883), on 23. 14. 4; the Loeb translation of Livy by E. Sage (London, 1936) at 33. 23. 5 or 34. 52. 4; the Budé translation of Livy by P. Jal (Paris, 1971), at 41. 7. 2; the Loeb translation of Pliny *NH* by H. Rackham (London, 1952), at 33. 16.

3. Cass. Dio 39. 65. 1, 55. 8. 1; Joseph. *BJ* 7. 123-31;

T. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*³, I (Leipzig, 1887), 127, n. 2; H. Versnel, *Triumphus: An Inquiry into the Origin, Development, and Meaning of the Roman Triumph* (Leyden, 1970), p. 163.

4. In addition to the references in the preceding note: Mommsen, *Staatsr.*³, I, 132; Von Blumenthal, s. v. "Pomerium," *RE*, XXI (1952), 1871 and bibliography there. On the differences between *imperium militiae* and *domi*: Cic. *Rep.* 1. 63, *Legg.* 3. 6 and 8.

5. Versnel, *Triumphus*, pp. 151-63, 384 ff.

6. *Triumphans urbem inire* (*invehi*): Versnel, *Triumphus*, p. 163. Whatever we make of the Porta Triumphalis, it seems unlikely to be other than on (or perhaps inside) the *pomerium* somewhere; for the most recent review and discussion of the problem, see F. Coarelli, "La Porta Trionfale e la Via dei Trionfi," *DArch.*, II (1968), 55-103, esp. 60 and notes. Further on the Porta: Versnel, *Triumphus*, pp. 132-34.